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We describe and experimentally demonstrate a more practical three-party quantum secret sharing
(QSS) protocol using polarization-entangled photon pairs. The source itself serves as an active
participant and can switch between the required photon states by modulating the pump beam only,
thereby making the protocol less susceptible to loss and amenable to fast switching. We derive a
security proof based on quantum key distribution, demonstrating our QSS protocol to be secure
against both eavesdropping and dishonest participants. Compared to three-photon protocols, the
practical efficiency is dramatically improved as there is no need to generate, transmit, or detect a
third photon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most quantum security protocols, such as quantum key
distribution (QKD) [1–4], are designed for two parties,
yet many practical security situations involve multiple
parties. An example is secret sharing, in which a secret
distributed to members of a group can be reconstructed
only when a sufficient number of the group members
combine their respective portions [5, 6]. In quantum se-
cret sharing (QSS), the partial secrets are distributed to
N participants via quantum states in such a way that
any subset of them containing at least k parties (with
k ≤ N) can combine their information to determine the
information possessed by the dealer. As initially envi-
sioned [7–9], QSS relies on distributing an (N+1)-partite
Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) state [10] to N+1
users who perform measurements; any one party can
function as the dealer, or secret holder, and the remaining
N players can determine the dealer’s result only if they
collaborate, making this a QSS technique for disseminat-
ing shared classical information. Other protocols have fo-
cused on QSS of quantum information [11, 12], and a va-
riety of alternative multipartite entangled resources have
been considered in both discrete- [13–18] and continuous-
variable [19–23] encodings. Yet large quantum states
are extremely challenging to realize in the laboratory,
and more practical QSS versions have emerged, based
on simpler quantum resources such as entangled photon
pairs [24–27] or single photons [28–31].
In this Letter, we introduce a modified entangled-
photon QSS protocol optimized for polarization qubits.
In contrast to the original proposal for Bell pairs [24],
preparing input states in our case is possible by mod-
ulation of the pump beam only, so that fast and lossy
phase modulators can be incorporated before quantum
state generation, thereby preserving entanglement down-
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stream. We experimentally observe the quantum corre-
lations required for our protocol, obtaining, on average,
three-party correlations at (89.3± 0.5)% with respect to
their ideal values. Bolstered by a security proof built on
QKD, our QSS protocol is practical and well-suited to
current technology.
II. BACKGROUND
At a high level, QSS relies on correlations present in the
preparation and measurement of some quantum system.
For one-to-N -party QSS of classical information, each
user (including the dealer) possesses two bits of data:
one bit is public, which is shared freely among all par-
ties; the other is private, revealed only to a subset of
players working together to determine the private bit of
the dealer (the secret). While both classical and quan-
tum secret sharing can be considered for subsets of size
k (k ≤ N) in so-called (k,N) threshold schemes, here we
focus on QSS for the particular case k = N ; that is, only
all N players sharing their private bits can determine the
private bit of the remaining (N + 1)th party.
The original GHZ-based protocol [7] enjoys a satis-
fying symmetry for all parties, with public bits being
measurement bases and private bits measurement results.
Yet GHZ states are notoriously difficult to generate, so
that experimental QSS demonstrations rely on intrinsi-
cally rare events, such as two-pair creation in sponta-
neous parametric downconversion (SPDC) [9]. Fortu-
nately, one-to-N QSS does not actually require (N + 1)-
partite entanglement, since each party need not mea-
sure a quantum system—only modify it. For example,
a single-photon protocol in which intermediate parties
rotate the state via one of four unitaries produces the
same correlations as measurements of a GHZ state [28].
Likewise, a source of entangled photon pairs switching
between four states permits QSS in which the source
is an active participant [24]. While demonstrated ex-
perimentally for time-bin entangled photons [25], to our
knowledge no implementation of two-photon QSS with
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
10
28
2v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
24
 M
ay
 20
19
2FIG. 1. Three-party quantum secret sharing protocol. Sara
chooses one of four entangled states; Alice and Bob randomly
select to measure in either the diagonal or circular bases,
recording their measurement results.
polarization qubits has been realized.
III. PROTOCOL
Figure 1 outlines our proposed protocol. We consider
the three-party correlations between source Sara and re-
ceivers Alice and Bob. Central to enabling a practical
polarization-entangled version of QSS is Sara’s choice of
states. We select the two φ Bell states as one basis, and
“plus/minus i” states as the other:
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉 ± |V V 〉)
|ϕ±〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉 ± i |V V 〉) , (1)
where |mn〉≡|m〉Alice⊗ |n〉Bob and |H〉 (|V 〉) denotes the
horizontal (vertical) polarization eigenstate. Any mea-
surement that would unambiguously identify the first
two states would not be able to discern the second
pair, and vice versa, due to the fact that | 〈φ±|ϕ±〉 |2 =
| 〈φ±|ϕ∓〉 |2 = 12 . In this way, we can define Sara’s public
bit S as the basis choice S ∈ {φ, ϕ} and her private bit
s as the state within that basis, s ∈ {+,−}.
Importantly, these states are more convenient for ex-
perimental implementation than those considered in pre-
vious proposals for two-photon QSS, where linear com-
binations of Bell states form the second basis [24, 27].
Use of a single source in that case for preparation of all
four states requires polarization rotation of one of the
two photons after generation. On the other hand, all the
states in Eq. (1) share the same correlations in H and
V , differing only in relative phase between the |HH〉 and
|V V 〉 contributions. Switching between all states can be
effected by modifying the phase between the H and V
components of the pump beam before generation. Since
loss experienced by the pump has no impact on state
generation (aside from needing more pump power), one
can employ high-speed and potentially lossy phase mod-
ulators without degrading the performance of QSS.
Alice and Bob measure in either the diagonal (D) or
circular (C) bases, with eigenstates
|D±〉= 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉) ; |C±〉= 1√
2
(|H〉 ± i |V 〉) . (2)
We can define Alice’s public bit A ∈ {D,C} (basis choice)
and private bit a ∈ {+,−} (result), and similarly for
Bob: public bit B ∈ {D,C} and private bit b ∈ {+,−}.
There are four combinations of public bits (S,A,B) that
produce a secret, identified by expressing Eq. (1) in terms
of |D±〉 and |C±〉:
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|D+D±〉+ |D−D∓〉)
= 1√
2
(|C+C∓〉+ |C−C±〉)
|ϕ±〉 = 1√
2
(|D+C±〉+ |D−C∓〉)
= 1√
2
(|C+D±〉+ |C−D∓〉) .
(3)
In other words, the correlations required for QSS appear
when Alice and Bob choose the same basis for the φ
states, and different bases for the ϕ states. If Sara se-
lects from s ∈ {+,−} with equal probability, the private
bits (s, a, b) in each of the above lines assume all possibil-
ities with equal probability individually and pairwise, yet
collectively they are perfectly correlated. We can express
the quantum correlation via the total parity (product of
the signs), ε = sab, which adopts the value +1 (−1) for
an even (odd) number of negative private bits, and has
a definite value in each of the rows in Eq. (3).
Table I provides a summary of the public bit combina-
tions leading to quantum correlations; for the other four
public bit selections, the outcomes ε = ±1 are equally
probable, and QSS is not possible. (As in other QSS
protocols, this 50% failure rate can be circumvented by
selecting basis combinations asymmetrically [8].)
We now describe how our QSS protocol proceeds and
outline its general security against both external eaves-
droppers and dishonest participants.
Quantum stage
1. Sara randomly selects public bits S ∈ {φ, ϕ} and
private bits s ∈ {+,−}, prepares the state |Ss〉,
and sends the photons to Alice and Bob.
2. Alice and Bob randomly and independently choose
to measure their photons in either the D or C basis.
3. When both Alice and Bob detect photons, the three
participants keep their data as raw key.
4. They repeat (1)-(3) to generate more raw key.
After the quantum stage, one party is chosen as the
dealer (either Sara, Alice, or Bob) while the other two
serve as players.
Classical post-processing stage
1. The dealer assumes player 1 is dishonest and player
2 is honest (there is no point to QSS if both players
are dishonest).
2. The dealer randomly selects a subset of raw key and
requests that player 1 announce both the public
and private bits.
3. The dealer and player 2 estimate a lower bound
secure key rate R1 for two-party QKD, under the
assumption that player 1 collaborates with eaves-
droppers (see details below).
34. They repeat steps (1)-(3) reversing the roles of the
two players, giving the lower bound secure key rate
R2.
5. The dealer determines the secure key rate R of the
QSS protocol as the minimum of R1 and R2.
6. The dealer requests the players to announce their
public bits for the remaining data [32]. Using Table
1 and all the public bits from the three parties,
the dealer announces the transmissions leading to
correlated data. All parties keep the corresponding
private bits as the sifted key.
7. The dealer generates the final QSS key from the
sifted key using one-way classical post-processing as
developed in QKD. Collaboratively, the two players
can recover the QSS key using their private bits
and error correction information from the dealer.
Alone, each of them gains only an exponentially
small amount of information about the QSS key.
IV. SECURITY
The security analysis of QSS is typically more involved
than that of QKD. A security proof of QSS against eaves-
droppers in the channels and dishonest players has only
appeared recently [22], which introduced the key idea to
treat measurements announced by the players as input or
output from an uncharacterized device, while the dealer
is assumed trusted. This allows them to apply the tools
developed in one-sided device-independent QKD [33] in
the security analysis of QSS. Here, we extend the above
idea by applying the security proof of standard QKD
with trusted devices, which can yield a better key rate in
practice. This is based on the observation that at least
one of the players in QSS is honest (although the dealer
does not know who). By evaluating the potential secure
key rate of QKD with each individual player (assuming
all the other players are dishonest) and using the smallest
one as the QSS key rate, security against collaborating
attacks between the eavesdropper and any N−1 players
can be guaranteed.
Here we briefly outline how to evaluate the secure key
rate given that at most one of the two players is dishonest.
There are two different cases:
Case 1: Dishonest player controls two-photon source.
Sara is the dishonest player; let us assume the dealer
is Alice. After the quantum stage, Alice randomly se-
lects a subset of raw data and requests that Sara an-
nounce which entanglement states she prepared in those
events. Given the information announced by Sara, the
QKD process between Alice and Bob becomes conven-
tional entanglement-based QKD with an untrusted en-
tanglement source between two honest users. Its uncon-
ditional security has been well established [34, 35].
Case 2: Dishonest player controls one set of detec-
tors. Let us deem Alice the dishonest player. To prove
security, we introduce a virtual three-photon GHZ-state-
TABLE I. Combinations of public bits leading to correlated
events, along with ideal values for the private bit correlation
(second column), those measured experimentally (third col-
umn), and QBER for pairwise combinations (fourth column).
Public Bits 〈ε〉 〈ε〉 Pairwise
(S,A,B) (Ideal) (Experiment) QBER [%]
(φ,D,D) +1 +0.89± 0.01 5.6± 0.7
(φ,C,C) −1 −0.88± 0.01 6.1± 0.7
(ϕ,D,C) +1 +0.901± 0.009 4.9± 0.6
(ϕ,C,D) +1 +0.90± 0.01 5.1± 0.7
based QKD protocol equivalent to the actual two-photon
protocol. Specifically, we assume Sara prepares the state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|HHH〉+ |V V V 〉) so that, by Eqs. (1)-(3),
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|D+〉 |φ+〉+ |D−〉 |φ−〉)
= 1√
2
(|C−〉 |ϕ+〉+ |C+〉 |ϕ−〉) . (4)
If Sara measures one photon in the D (C) basis, de-
pending on her measurement result, the other two pho-
tons will be projected onto |φ+〉 or |φ−〉 (|ϕ+〉 or |ϕ−〉),
which are the states she prepares in the actual protocol.
This implies the equivalence between this virtual pro-
tocol using GHZ states and the actual protocol. Since
the measurements of different participants commute with
each other, we can switch the order without changing the
statistics of the measurement results. We can imagine
that both Sara and Bob will keep their photons until Al-
ice announces her measurement basis and results. In this
picture, if Alice follows the protocol, she will project the
other two photons onto one of the four entangled states
in Eq. (1). With the information announced by Alice,
Sara and Bob will know which entanglement state has
been prepared. The QKD process between Sara and Bob
again becomes conventional entanglement-based QKD.
V. EXPERIMENT
In order to explore these correlations experimentally,
we utilize the polarization-entangled photon source in
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FIG. 3. Experimentally measured outcome probabilities for Alice and Bob, conditioned on input state and measurement bases.
Fig. 2. Based on a similar design for 1550 nm entangled
photons [36], this source relies on type-0 SPDC in two
parallel, orthogonally rotated, periodically poled lithium
niobate (PPLN) crystals. With a combination of beam
displacers preceding and following the two crystals, we
are able to generate a superposition of HH and V V pho-
ton pair amplitudes in a single spatial mode. This de-
sign is stable and has been shown to offer bright, high-
fidelity entanglement [36], with a modified version ap-
plied in one of the seminal loophole-free Bell inequality
tests [37]. The main difference here is the creation of non-
degenerete photons; we pump with a frequency-doubled
Nd:YAG laser at 532 nm and produce photons at 810 nm
(Alice) and 1550 nm (Bob), using a dichroic splitter to
separate them. By modulating the phase between the
two pump polarizations prior to the first beam displacer,
we ideally produce the state |Ψ〉 ∝ |HH〉+eiα |V V 〉, with
the phase α tunable from 0 to 2pi, producing Sara’s QSS
states [Eq. (1)].
To characterize each of these states, we utilize polar-
ization analyzers in both of the photon arms. To re-
duce noise on the InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
used for the 1550 nm photon, we trigger them with de-
tections on the free-running Si APDs for the 810 nm
photon using an FPGA. As an example, the fidelity for
preparation of the state |φ+〉 we measure at 〈φ+|ρ|φ+〉 =
0.949±0.001 (without subtraction of accidentals), where
we use Bayesian tomography to reconstruct the full two-
photon density matrix ρ [38, 39].
To test all QSS correlations, we prepare Sara’s four
states and measure the coincidences in every D/C basis
combination for Alice and Bob. After backing out loss
and detector efficiency [39], we obtain the sixteen nor-
malized probability distributions in Fig. 3. Each column
denotes a particular state, while each row shows a spe-
cific Alice/Bob basis combination. As expected, strong
correlations result for the cases in Table I, while near-
uniform probabilities are obtained for the remaining pub-
lic bit combinations. We can quantify the correlation in
each case using an Alice/Bob parity measure, εs = ab,
subscript s signifying that this is conditioned on a spe-
cific state from Sara. Its expectation value is given by
〈εs〉 = P++ + P−− − P+− − P−+, with the probabilities
taken from the relevant plot in Fig. 3.
We calculate all sixteen of these correlation measures
and display them in Fig. 4. (Error bars are ± one stan-
dard deviation, computed from the Bayesian posterior
distribution underlying the probabilities in Fig. 3.) For
the basis combinations DD and CC, we find strong cor-
relations with the |φ±〉 states, while for DC and CD the
correlations are strong for |ϕ±〉. We can combine pairs
of these results to compute the expectation of the three-
party correlation parameter 〈ε〉 = 12 (〈εs=+〉 − 〈εs=−〉),
where we have assumed that each of Sara’s options
s ∈ {+,−} are chosen with equal probability. This yields
the numbers in the third column of Table I, whose ab-
solute values average to 0.893 ± 0.005 compared to the
ideal of unity. The corresponding pairwise QBER values
(as needed for security analysis) follow in the fourth col-
umn. In our example, with completely honest players,
the QBER is identical for each pair of users and equal to
1
2 (1−| 〈ε〉 |). All values fall well below the 11% threshold
of entanglement-based QKD using one-way communica-
tion [34, 35], indicating the capacity for a positive secure
QSS rate in our setup.
VI. DISCUSSION
While we have focused on pure QSS here, our physical
setup is also compatible with QKD between any two of
the three parties. With no modifications to the quantum
stage of the protocol (state preparation and measure-
ment), QKD between two participants can be realized
5FIG. 4. Experimentally measured correlations, as expressed
by expectation of the parity of Alice’s and Bob’s results.
by requiring the remaining party to reveal both public
and private bits. This amounts to implementing steps
(1)-(3) of the classical post-processing stage, but now for
all raw key values, not just a random subset. Such an
approach to QKD is especially flexible in that the com-
municating parties can be decided after all raw data has
been collected. Additionally, by adding intermediate par-
ticipants between the source and receivers (as in single-
qubit QSS [28]), the protocol here can be extended to
more than three users as well. Already considered as an
extension of single-photon QSS [40], the use of entan-
gled photons should benefit from the same advantages of
entangled-photon QKD in the traditional point-to-point
setting—namely, no need for decoy states and increased
tolerance to loss [4]. However, adding users between the
source and detectors will require Trojan-horse counter-
measures. Whereas the “one-way” configuration of our
basic three-user QSS protocol is naturally immune to
Trojan-horse attacks [41], the many-user case is suscep-
tible to an eavesdropper sending in and extracting probe
light to read the phase shifts applied by intermediate
parties. This is a known QSS vulnerability [40] that ap-
plies in extending our approach. Thus security measures
beyond the proof introduced here would be essential for
additional parties.
Finally, one of the primary practical advantages of our
polarization-entangled QSS protocol is the reliance on
pump polarization modulation to select Sara’s quantum
state, rather than modulation after photon-pair genera-
tion. When placed before the downconversion crystal as
done here, any introduced modulator loss can be com-
pensated simply by turning up the pump power after
the modulator but before the downconversion crystal,
preserving the ideal pair emission probability. On the
other hand, were a fast polarization modulator placed
in either the signal or idler paths after generation to
set the state, any loss would reduce the rate of trans-
mitted entangled pairs, and hence the QSS rate as well.
In this case, turning up the pump power to compensate
would introduce additional noise from increased multi-
pair emission, so that the secure key rate would not be
maintained. As an example, typical commercial fiber-
pigtailed modulators impart ∼3 dB loss, corresponding
to either a two-fold reduction in coincidences, or equiva-
lently a four-fold increase in multipair probability for the
same coincidence rate, when comparing post-generation
modulation against the pump modulation of our scheme.
In conclusion, we have introduced a pragmatic ap-
proach for QSS with polarization-entangled photons,
with security based on that of QKD. Relying on pump
phase modulation to prepare the necessary entangled
states, our method tolerates high-speed and lossy phase
modulators without degrading the performance of QSS.
Our experimental implementation reveals the correla-
tions necessary for three-party secret sharing, and ex-
tending to additional parties should be possible with
minor modifications. Our approach could extend two-
photon entanglement-based QKD to multiple users by
promoting the entanglement source to a user and adopt-
ing a QSS protocol. This practical use of quantum re-
sources should benefit commercial cryptography develop-
ment and may inspire further improvements to QKD and
QSS implementations.
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